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Our lawmakers first crafted our public housing programs and policies in the 1930s, at the
end of the Great Depression. Over the past sixty years, Congress has revisited these issues
several times. Congress modified the original housing program, the United States Housing Act
of 1937, with the Housing and Urban Redevelopment Act of 1949. In 1966, Congress again
debated housing issues, this time searching for alternatives to Public Housing. In 1997, Congress
continued to debate major housing legislation. Public housing has clearly been an important
issue to Americans and their lawmakers in the twentieth century.
Each time Congress considers housing, it discusses two main questions: "Who should
public housing be for?" and "Why should we have public housing?" As the answers to these
questions have changed over time, so have our public housing policies and programs.
Public housing, by definition, has always been for low-income Americans. However,
from the 1930s to the 1950s, housing was for the low income within the working class. Since the
1950s, public housing has been for the poorest of the poor. This shift in clientele caused public
housing to change from a program for short-term economic support to one for long-term social
welfare assistance. At the same time, public housing's image has become increasingly negative
in the eyes of the American people.
Congress has also changed its mind concerning the reasons for public housing programs.
During each housing debate prior to 1997, some members of Congress provided economic
reasons for public housing, while others argued that helping the needy should be our driving
concern. Members of Congress will always claim to embrace helping the needy, but they seem
much more willing to act when economic growth is involved. The congressional debates
concerning public housing in this century support this argument. In the debates of 1937, 1948,
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and 1966, Congress presented economic benefits of housing programs, then voted to implement
them. In 1997, Congress presents no such benefits, and votes to curtail housing programs.
Many factors influence congressional debate, but the economy is always one of the most
important. Regime theory suggests that all of a nation's political ideas are molded by that
nation's dominant means of accumulating capital. As the methods of making money change, so,
too, will the political ideas. Connections between money and politics are not new. If a politician
wants to be re-elected, he or she had better make sure the economy prospers. The best way to
make the economy prosper is to cater to the interests of the powerful businesspeople who run the
economy. Therefore, generally, political ideas will follow economic ideas.
Theoretically, there have been two dominant economic regimes of the 20th century. The
first, progressive-liberalism or modernism holds two basic economic tenets. They were a Fordist
approach to production and a Keynsian approach to consumption. Henry Ford, for whom
Fordism is named, pioneered the use of the assembly line. This method of production made his
cars less expensive that others, and available to a very wide market of customers. Producers of
other goods followed his examples during much of the twentieth century. John Maynard Keynes,
an famous English economist, maintained that the best way for an economy to prosper was to
include more and more people in the market for more and more goods. Progressive-liberal
government leaders implemented policies that helped people consume as many goods as
possible.
Along with these economic ideas went ideals of community ownership and a commitment
to social welfare programs. Our economic system needed the poor to increase their consumption
and thus expand the markets for our goods. The poor cannot simply buy a house, and all of the
accessories that go with it. They need government help. Theoretically, the poor consumed the
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least, so their consumption had the potential to increase the most. So, following regime theory,
politicians in the progressive-liberal era would have supported social welfare programs as
methods of increasing the consumption of the poor and of expanding the national economy.
These social programs could be funded primarily because large corporations were willing to pay
higher taxes. As long as their taxes were helping to cultivate long-term market growth, everyone
was happy.
Sometime during the 1960s, countries such as Japan and Germany began selling large
numbers of their goods within the United States. They were expanding their markets by moving
into other countries, and American companies were losing out. Gradually, American business
leaders began to realize that they needed to move into other countries to expand their markets as
well. Decades of isolation had allowed American companies to be very inefficient. Foreign
companies were producing better products and reaping the benefits. American companies
needed to expand to other countries, to modernize, and to become more efficient. To do so, they
needed -capital, and could no longer afford to pay high taxes. The ability to expand overseas
meant that they no longer needed the American poor, so they had no reason to keep paying high
taxes. Theoretically, the post-modem or neo-conservative era began sometime in the 1970s and
continues today. In this era, we assign less value to social welfare programs, because they no
longer benefit powerful companies.
What will happen to a specific political program that persists through different economic
regimes? The above description is very simplistic. No particular program should conform
exactly to the theory, but long-term general trends should. This study examines the public
housing program in the United States, beginning in the middle 1930s and continuing to the
present day. Public Housing is a classic progressive-liberal social program that was borne out of
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the Great Depression. The first major public housing law, passed in 1937, has remained the
symbolic basis for public housing to the present day. In 1997, Congress began considering a bill
which would reform public housing and repeal the 1937 Housing Act. Did we value public
housing more during the progressive-liberal era than we do today? If so, is this change in
priorities due to changes in public housing'S residents and changes in our economic system?

In attempting to answer these questions, I will concentrate less on actual changes in
public housing than on changes in congressional arguments over time. Although many factors
besides Congress' attitudes have the potential to change public housing, congressional arguments
should be a good measure of what our leaders think about housing. Additonally, changes in laws
are slow to become physical housing changes. Congressional arguments will change more
rapidly, as Congress changes its collective manner of thinking. A major potential drawback to
researching congressional debate is that one can never tell if a member of Congress really
believes what he or she is saying, or if there is some ulterior motive for taking that position. In
any case, observing how Congress changes its positions on a single issue over the course of sixty
years will provide interesting insights.
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THE UNITED STATES HOUSING ACT OF 1937 (WAGNER-STEAGULL ACT)
The 1937 Public Housing Law set the stage for all of the United States' public housing
efforts of the 20th century. According to its supporters in Congress, the law was intended to
eliminate "unsafe, unsanitary" housing for low-income families, reduce unemployment, stimulate
business activity, and create a U.S. Housing Authority. The main provision of the bill was to
create a National Housing Authority that would supply grants and loans to local housing
authorities. The local housing authorities would then use the money to finance housing for
families who could not afford private housing. In general, the bill proposed that the federal
government would pay for construction of public housing, while tenants' rents would pay for
operation.
Like any law, the 1937 Housing Act was a product of its time. Fears about disease, crime,
and the legacy of the Great Depression coincided with a housing shortage, high unemployment,
and the power of labor unions to influence this landmark legislation. Housing had become a
moral and economic "anchor," providing stability to our country in turbulent times. The law,
fueled by all these concerns, was indicitive of a shift to the Keynesian economic thinking which
anchored the progressive-liberal regime in the United States throughout most of the twentieth
century.
The Great Depression has influenced American ideas and policy throughout this century,
but its memory was especially clear to Americans in the late 1930s. Much of the economy had
recovered, but some sectors were lagging behind, and every minor recession held the possiblility
of becoming the next depression.
One sector of the economy that had not recovered was the building industry.
Unemployment in the building trades was clearly a major driving force behind the 1937 bill. In
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1936, Senator Robert Wagner, a Democrat from New York, its main sponsor, stressed the need
for a housing program by claiming that fifty percent of the nation's eleven million unemployed
men were building industry workers. In addition, he claimed that an additional thirty-five
percent of unemployed men work in trades directly dependent on the building industry. Thus, an
amazing eighty-five percent of America's unemployed were unemployed due to the building
industry's slump (CR 4889).
Why were these people unemployed, and why did Senator Wagner care so much? He
stated that unemployment was not caused by the depression, and therefore was not temporary.
Rather, "changes in the mechanical methods of business" caused permanent changes in our
economy. Mechanical production was replacing people and leading to high rates of
unemployment. He stated that per capita production was twenty-five percent higher in 1936 than
in 1929. Overall production did not match this rate, so people lost jobs. To Wagner,
unemployment was clearly a problem that was affecting everyone: "Unemployment has become
a Frankenstein created by our modem industrial system." "The yet uncured sore spots in our
economic system must not be neglected or they will again threaten the whole system with
disease" (4889).
Was the answer to our problems to reverse the technological trends that had created this
disaster? Wagner did not think so. He stated that "to interrupt (technology) would be to stop the
very thing that has brought us from savagery into civilization." Wagner was clearly progressive;
to him, progress was inevitable. Technological improvements were "good for the people as a
whole." He believed that if technological advances continue, they would create "possibilities of
a new era of abundance." Wagner also endorsed the progressive belief that technology would
bring increased recreational opportunities to our workforce. He stated that "working people will
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have greater opportunities for leisure and self-development." However, all benefits of progress
could only come if the economy expanded, and the economy could only expand if work was
found for the jobless, who were "draining our national resources" (4889).
By making these and similar statements, Wagner is clearly endorsing a Keynsian model
of economic development, emphasizing that markets need to expand by including more and more
of the American people. In a radio address in 1937, Wagner states, "While the depression has
been broken, there is still need to create even wider opportunities for reasonable business
profits." He believed that the consumer goods industries had greatly recovered, but claimed they
could not expand further because of low national purchasing power. Clearly, he believed that
unemployment was a major cause of that lack in purchasing power. Thus, the economy cannot
expand until the unemployment problem is remedied. (6258)
Any attempt to reduce unemployment and stimulate home building would require a
broader market for housing. Wagner believes this market should include both wealthier and
poorer Americans. "We must not repeat the errors· of the 1920s, when the building boom took
care of those at the top but neglected the foundation, and thus ended in collapse" (4892).
Most supporters of the housing bill seemed to agree that the bill's main purpose was to
reduce unemployment. Edward Curley of the House of Representatives, another Democrat from
New York, agreed with Wagner. Curley stated that "any remedy to restore normalcy" to our
economic structure must restore building industry workers to their jobs. His three stated reasons
for supporting the bill were improving worker's living conditions, re-employing building
workers, and broadening and stabilizing the potential market of the building industry (4602).
Sources outside of Congress confirmed the job-creation orientation of the 1937 Housing
Act. On May 23, 1936, the Houston Chronicle endorsed the bill, stating that the building
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industry was the only unrecovered American industry (9327). Additionally, modem housing
scholars agree on unemployment's importance. Both Dick Cluster and Richard Bingham state
that unemployment was the major reason for the act's passage (18, 58). The unemployment issue
fits well into Marxist theory. Marxist theorists believe our lawmakers are primarily concerned
with pacifying the working class and serving business interests. Not only does reducing
unemployment reduce the likelihood of social unrest, but it will also bring formerly unemployed
people into the housing market, expanding opportunities for business.
Besides building industry unemployment, the Great Depression influenced support for the
Housing Act in other ways. As a result of the depression, many Americans could not afford
adequate housing. These people lived in slums, large clusters of substandard housing located in
every American city. Slum dwellers made up the huge potential market of which Mr. Wagner
and Mr. Curley spoke, but they also presented other problems to our policy makers. Slums were
widely viewed as breeding grounds for crime and disease, and many people wanted them
destroyed. Many social activists believed that decent housing should be available to all people,
as a natural right. One group of social activists emphasized the removal of slums, another the
creation of housing. The controversy over the relative importance of slum clearance versus
housing plagued the public housing movement into the 1960s, and likely led to many of public
housing's most infamous failures (Bauman 23). During the debate over the 1937 Housing Act,
the two seemed equally important.
In the early 1930s, some social activists began to call for a public housing program.

Many believed decent housing was a right, which all people deserved. Many also hoped public
housing would be a stepping stone to a new, communitarian social order. They envisioned public
housing as a tool not only for recovery, but also for restructuring the country's social order.
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These activists were led in part by Catherine Bauer, who published Modern Housing in 1934. In
it, she established three important guidelines for successful public housing. She claimed that any
housing program must come from the initiative of the working class, must have quality housing
as its highest priority, and must be placed on dispersed, peripherial sites to maintain costeffectiveness (23). While the 1937 Public Housing Act did come, at least in part, from the
initiative of the working class, it specifically made the reduction of unemployment and the
clearance of slums higher priorities than quality housing. Due to the emphasis on slum
clearance, public housing projects were concentrated in central cities, not scattered throughout
metropolitan areas.
Public housing was never intended primarily to produce quality housing. There has
always been some other purpose or motivation. According to Bauman, different groups lobbied
in favor of the 1937 Housing Act, all for very different reasons. "Congressional tesimony on the
Wagner bill by communitarians such as Wood, Bauer, and Woodbury continually emphasized
good, well-designed housing and the need for children to grow up in safe, sanitary homes; in
contrast, Ernest Bohn, testifYing in behalf of the professionally-oriented NAHO, stressed the
economic and social costs of slums and denied that public housing necessarily competed with
private sector housing" (43). Beginning with the 1937 law, housing has been closely tied to slum
clearance. The "replacement rule," a part of the housing act, ensured that public housing would
not flood the housing market with new housing. Units of public housing could only be built after
substandard units were destroyed in slum clearance (Jacobs 81). Thus, the supply of housing
remained constant, and the price of private housing did not decrease. The replacement rule is
just one of many safeguards in the housing act that protects private builders' profits.
Congressional arguments confirm the relative importance of slum clearance over the production
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of quality housing. The shortage of decent housing for needy Americans is mentioned by
Congressmen many times, but the need to destroy the evils of slums is discussed even more
frequently.
Mr. Wagner, who obviously had several reasons for supporting the bill, clearly believed
that slums are causes of disease and crime. He spoke of the "universally accepted truth that
substandard housing conditions aggravate disease, crime, and immorality." Emphasizing that
removing bad housing is as important as building new housing, he urged his colleagues to
support the "socially enlightened policy of clearing away the areas where disease and crime find
their natural breeding place." Mr. Wagner seemed to truly believe that his slum clearance and
housing programs would improve people's lives, thereby reducing the incentive for crime. He
stated, "If we wish to check the transgressions that the young are perpetrating against society, we
must first remedy the injustices that society has perpetrated against them." Mr. Wagner's plan to
eliminate crime and disease fit nicely with his plan for economic recovery. Not only is crime a
social problem, but "vice and crime are heavy costs upon the purse and vitality of the people."
(CR 1936 7609)
The problem of crime hints at a much larger problenl: widespread social unrest. Nathan
Strauss, the first administrator of the United States Housing Authority, spoke about this concern:
"A nation built on human misery at the bottom is unstable for those at the top. Your hard
business sense tells you that crime, disease, and revolt against society is bred in the slums. A
decent home for every American family would be a stout bulwark indeed for our democratic
form of government and our free institutions. The slums must go or the society that tolerates
them will" (Jacobs 80).
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Henry Ellenbogen, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, the main House sponsor of the bill,
argued that the local economic costs of slums were extremely high. He mentioned an area in
Cleveland where, in one year, the city spent two million dollars on services and collected less
than 200,000 dollars in taxes. Most members of Congress envisioned public housing working
simultaneously with slum clearance, limiting the new housing to central city slum locations, but
Ellenbogen had different ideas. He hoped that public housing would be first built on vacant land,
then slums cleared and more housing built (CR 1936 7609). In 1936, this distinction was minor,
but it became more important in later years.
Congress was very concerned with Europe's experience with public housing. Mr.
Wagner, particularly, cited London's success as a reason the United States should implement a
housing and slum clearance program. He pointed out that many United States cities had a
homocide rate thirty times larger than London's, where slums had been cleared. He also asserted
that "England's recovery is due largely to the construction activities of the Government (4891)."
Slum clearance and murder rates were not necessarily correlated, but Mr. Wagner apparently
assumed they were. Many supporters of the bill viewed England's policies as wonderfully
progressive, while many opponents viewed them as dangerously socialistic.
Congress was at least somewhat concerned with providing quality housing for the needy.
Due to pressure from labor unions, lawmakers were especially worried about needy members of
the working class. Catherine Bauer had called for the working class to push for public housing,
and the labor unions of the 1930s responded. Pressure from organized labor was one of the
major reasons the bill passed. Michael Jacobs believes one of the major motivations behind the
1937 bill was to "respond to the ever-growing trade union movement." He claims that "pressure
from labor" led to the bill (73). The bill was supported by the AFL, and by most of our nation's
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working class. Most Americans supported the bill, a fact that most members of Congress must
have considered.
Congress responded to labor, and it also realized that there was a serious housing supply
crisis, which was affecting much of the population. Mr. Curley estimated that fifty percent of the
population could 110t afford decent housing. Mr. Wagner estinlated that the nUITlber was above
sixty percent. Another congressman, Samuel Dickstein, a Democrat from New York, believed
the crisis would grow much worse. He pointed out that many families were "doubled up" in
homes, that the nunlber of new families by marriage would soon increase, that a large number of
people were moving from farms to cities, and that the average family size was decreasing,
necessitating more homes per capita (CR 1936 10036). Many members ofCongess were
concerned with this obvious need for new homes. Mr. Curley stated that public housing should
"remain permanently in reach of low income groups." Mr. Wagner advocated housing for the
"vast majority who need it most." He urged his fellow congressmen to "make sure that large and
deserving sections of the population are not forgotten in the midst of recovery" (6258).
So, members of Congress in the 1930s at least talked about the ideal of providing quality
housing for Americans who could not afford it. Who were these Americans? Congress was
providing housing not because they believed it was some natural and inalienable right, for all
people. The poor who eventually lived in the first wave of public housing had very special
characteristics that distinguished them from today's typical pubic housing tenants.
First, they were a potentially large group. Fifty to sixty percent of the population is a
huge number of people. That many people could have great influence when voting. Even more
likely, by not having a home and not consuming as much as possible, that many people would
cause a major disruption to our economy. The wealthy needed the poor to continue to prosper.
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Second, early public housing tenants were usually families. In fact, the bill specifically
instructed housing authorities to favor families when choosing tenants. During the debate, the
privileged position of families was never questioned. Our lawmakers simply assumed that the
housing would be primarily for families. Mr. Curley stated the purpose of the debate was to find
ways to supply new housing for low-income families who could not get it alone (4602). One of
Mr. Wagner's four main reasons for supporting the bill was that it developed decent, safe, and
sanitary housing for families of low income (4889). Families, specifically nuclear families, were
assumed to be the preffered manner of living. This assumption is a sign both of the time period
and of the motivations of the bill's supporters. The congressional debates of 1936 suggest that
"family values" were even more popular than they are today. Also, families, especially with
children, happen to consume many more goods per housing unit than single people, putting more
money back into the economy than a single person or a couple would. Members of congress
were also interested in promoting "stability," after all the chaos of the depression. Members of
stable families were assumed to be unlikely to commit crimes or revolt against society.
Finally, potential public housing tenants were members of the working class. Congress
made it clear that public housing was for the "deserving" poor. This "deserving" poor was the
working poor. Peter DeMuth, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, makes this clear on August 11 th,
1937, when he defended the bill by explaining that "no tenants will be accepted who do not have
steady employment at sufficient wages to pay the proposed rent, however low it may be" (8697).
With current anti-public housing rhetoric centering on returning power to local areas, it is
interesting to note that the congress of the 1930s was very much in favor of local control. Mr.
Wagner emphasized that housing was a "community matter," and that power should be given to
local authorities, whose ideas come "from the initiative of the people in the communities
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concerned" (CR 1936 4891). By "local authorities," Wagner does not mean local elected
officials. He means appointed administrators of local housing authorities, semi-autonomous
local non-profit organizations funded by tenant rent and federal money. Supporters of the bill
considered local governments to be too full of corruption, and hoped "professional"
administrators would more closely pursue Congress' goals. Mr. Curley emphasized that local
management should be "professional, not political." This emphasis on professionalism, as well
as Mr. Curley's defense that the bill "was submitted to me by experts," reveals that he and other
supporters followed the tenets of progressive-liberalism (4603). "Professional experts" were
very respected and were assumed to know best how to solve problems and to handle situations
(Pynoos 11). Mr. Ellenbogen was another supporter who advocated local control but wanted to
reduce corruption. He defended the bill by claiming that it provided flexibility enough to meet
local needs while also mandating federal standards to ensure proper use. Local control was
meant to allow the programs to serve specific social and economic needs of localities. Local
business needs were particularly important. In 1936, Mr. Wagner confinned this by claiming
"the strict decentralization of administration among the various localities would guarantee that all
activity be carried out in close contact with the general business needs of the community" (4891).
As every city was different, local control would help the program reach its objectives, provided
corruption didn't get in the way.
Interestingly, the bill's opponents also advocated "local control," and claimed it as a
reason to oppose the bill. Before the Great Depression, American social programs were
considered the responsibility of local government. Robert Luce, a Republican from
Massachusetts, argued that housing was a local responsibility, one for which the federal
government should not need to provide money (CR 19379236). Indeed, the affordability of the
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project was one of the major reasons opponents did not support the bill. They believed the
federal government should not and could not pay for the new programs. Arthur Vandenburg, a
Republican from Michigan and a vocal opponent, claimed that "we don't have the money" to
sustain large projects (9347). Walter George, a Democrat from Georgia and another opponent,
was against any "additional tax upon the taxpayers of this country" (9564).
The other major argument against the bill was that it would cause the United States to
become socialist. Mr. George claimed public housing was "a roadway ... that will have literally
no end" and would eventually lead to "a state of socialism." He claimed "we cannot build homes
for a part of our people without building houses ultimately for the remainder of our people"
(9564). The National Lumber Dealers' Association, one of the few national organizations that
opposed the bill, claimed that "no federal government can provide homes for all its citizens, and
past experience of the Federal Government's participation in vast housing developments has
resulted in tremendous waste and failures." They claimed the bill would "interfere with private
building of homes" (9350). Mr. George called public housing "a threat to private enterprise"
(9564).
Due to these objections, the bill's supporters spent much time explaining how the bill was
intended to help private builders. Additionally, bill supporters claimed the program would
promote democratic values. Mr. Wagner went into detail about how the proposed law would
help business: " ...a low rent program would give a decided impetus to private industry. It
would create purchasing power by swelling the volume of employment. It would increase the
demand for raw and fabricated materials that business produces. It would tone up the residential
standards of every element of the population" (Jacobs 73).
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Lawmakers also emphasized how the bill would protect private industry. Tenants must
be able to afford a rent significantly lower than the minimum needed to obtain standard private
housing in an area. Public housing was intended for people who could not afford private
housing. Since the income ceilings were tied to the cost of private housing, the ceilings would
lower when private housing became cheaper.

In addition, cost limits for public housing construction were extremely low. These
restrictions were not meant solely to save money. Private industry demanded that public housing
be built cheaply so that no one would ever choose public housing over private housing. Evidence
from after the first units were built suggests that the cost limits worked well. "The first results,
under local direction, were almost universally ugly and depressing developments, segregated,
stigmatized by origin and residency requirements, resented by local citizens, and located in the
worst sections of town" (Jacobs 81). Mr. Wagner understated the situation in 1936 when he
claimed that the bill "contains every possible safeguard against competition with private
industry" (Jacobs 73).
The housing program was first introduced in Congress in 1935, but not passed until 1937.
The major reason seems to be that Franklin Roosevelt did not endorse the bill until 1937.
"Without pressure from the executive to force the housing bill out of the House committee,
which was strongly influenced by the building sector, the measure was doomed to failure"
(Jacobs 80). One of Roosevelt's reasons for not endorsing the bill may have been that other New
Deal programs were working, and the economy was recovering. A recession in August of 1937
seemed to change Roosevelt's mind. "The recession once and for all made Roosevelt a believer
in the necessity for permanent state intervention and the application of the Keynsian principle of
deficit spending" (Jacobs 80). After he endorsed the bill, it passed by a vote of four to one in the
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Senate and three to one in the House. Roosevelt's sudden endorsement supports the notion that
economic recovery was the primary motivating factor behind the passage of the 1937 Housing
Act. To those concerned with quality housing, the outcome was mixed. Bauman argues that the
bill "represented a compromise-- a fusion of communitarian vision, professional empiricism, and
political reality. The legislation clearly satisfied the housers' demand for a permanent housing
agency, but couched the housing vision in the Depression-era vocabulary of national emergency
and job creation" (43).
Everyone who spoke of the welfare and well-being of the poor during the debates over the
1937 public housing act made a critically important assumption. They assumed that problems
among the less privileged in society would cause universal problems. Whether the crisis was the
possibility of economic depression caused by under-consumption, or the possibility of a
revolution if the poor became too unruly and unhappy, the most powerful members of our society
respected the role of the poor. They believed that their own power, and the health of the nation,
depended on everyone's well-being. Therefore, they believed the government should ensure the
success of all its citizens, because failure by a few meant catastrophe for the many. Mr. Wagner
summarized the attitude of the 1930s by asserting that "we are passing from an age when the
worthy individual could help himself to an era when we must rely more and more upon
cooperative action" (Jacobs 78). This attitude would continue unchanged until well after the
passage of the next major housing legislation in 1949.
The debate over the 1937 Housing Act clearly supports the idea that economic concerns
were very important to lawmakers. Issues such as reducing unemployment and creating new
markets were the driving forces behind the bill. Also, the 1937 act's housing was clearly
intended for the working poor, who would provide the most economic benefit for the nation.
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Other concerns were very important, but without the underlying economic benefits, it is unlikely
the 1937 Housing Act would ever have become law.
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THE HOUSING ACT OF 1949 (TAFT-ELLENDER-WAGNER BILL)
The first major modification to the 1937 public housing act came in 1949.
Twelve years had passed since Congress passed the original act, and our country was a
very different place. We had recovered fronl the Depression and fought World War Two.
The war, cOlnbined with economic prosperity, caused massive changes in Americans'
living patterns. As thousands of veterans returned fronl the war, experts anticipated
another housing and employment crisis similar to the one which occurred during the
1930s. It is in this context that Congress debated the 1948 Public Housing and Urban
Renewal Act, which they eventually passed as the Housing Act of 1949. The effects of
the Act, along with a migration of city dwellers to suburban areas and an equally large
move of southern blacks to northern cities, dramatically changed our country's urban
areas (Bauman in Schaffer 285).
The 1948 Taft-Ellender-Wagner bill made several important modifications to the
1937 Housing Act. The biggest change was a renewed and re-funded urban
redevelopment slum clearance program. More than any other program, the urban renewal
program drastically affected public housing. The 1948 act stipulated that urban
redevelopment areas be primarily used for housing, a stipulation that was removed in only
a few years. The urban renewal/public housing interplay is one of the great urban issues
of the 20th century. Had public housing been more independent from urban renewal, it
might have been a much more successful program. Besides the emphasis on urban
renewal, the TEW bill also made specific changes to public housing. It authorized 160
million dollars to construct up to 500,000 new units over five years (CD 1948 171). It
also stated that local housing authorities could not discriminate against tenants who were
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receiving other fonns of federal assistance, such as welfare. Additionally, the bill ordered
that housing authorities give priority to potential tenants who were displaced by public
action, such as urban renewal (Prescott 24). These policy changes eventually began to
alter the social composition of public housing's residents. With a different constituency,
public housing began to serve an entirely different purpose. Public housing began to
become what it is today.
Why did Congress make such important changes to the public housing program?
The reasons are varied, but they fall into three general categories. The current program
had done little to solve urban problems. Congress feared a housing shortage, especially
one which would affect the vast numbers of returning veterans, a potentially huge voting
block with great political power. Perhaps most importantly, Congress wanted to help
downtown businessmen who were concerned with the economic devaluation of central
business districts. Soon after the monumental changes of the 1949 Act, public housing
became less of a "way-station" for the temporarily troubled working class, and more of a
pennanent home for the poorest of our poor. The debates over all of these issues
continued one of the fundamental arguments surrounding the 1937 law, the dispute
between those who advocated public housing for housing's sake, and those who wanted to
serve another end, such as slum clearance or economic development.
While the Housing Act of 1937 had provided much quality housing, it clearly had
not even begun to solve the problems of urban slums and of widespread substandard
housing conditions. Bauman makes this point while discussing Philadelphia's situation:
"By 1943, despite federal aid from ... New Deal alphabet agencies, and despite the
passage of the 1937 Wagner-Steagull Housing Act, basic urban services such as water
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delivery, sewer, lighting, and education had deteriorated, leaving an ever-expanding area
of urban slums and blight" (Bauman in Schaffer 232). So, by the middle 1940s, the 1937
law had ceased to work as well as its drafters had hoped it would. America once again
faced a housing shortage, and members of Congress attempted to draft yet another
housing bill.
During World War II, housing advocates and urban planners worried about how
they would house returning GIs and their families. They feared a housing shortage as
severe as the one ten years earlier. Many planners envisioned expanded public housing as
an answer to the coming crisis. Guy Greer, senior economist of the Board of Directors of
the Federal Reserve System, estimated in 1944 that the U.S. needed 1.6 million new
dwellings per year for the next ten years. Because many Americans had low incomes, he
concluded that public housing would play an important role in meeting this need
(Bauman in Schaffer 236). After the war, private industry, fueled by governmentsubsidized home loans and highway building, constructed homes in record numbers.
Housing production had slumped very low during the war, when all labor and materials
were directed toward the war effort. A population increase, migration into cities, and a
wartime building slump combined to create a huge housing demand (CD 166). Private
industry responded, building 859,000 homes in 1947 (166). However, the building
industry had a history of inconsistency. Before rebounding in 1947, it had built 715,000
homes in 1941, but only 169,000 in 1944 (166). Like Greer, most experts predicted a
need for well over a million homes each year for the next decade, and Congress was
unsure that the building industry could provide so many homes without help.
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Not only were planning experts convinced of the need for massive numbers of
new homes, but they had also established ideas about how our reconfigured cities should
look. "Architects, planners, and housers often traced the roots of urban social and
physical decay to the haphazard urban growth pattern inherited from the nineteenth
century" (Bauman in Schaffer 233). Planners of the 1940s were interested in space and
order. They viewed the city as an organism, and were fearful of urban slums.
Unchecked, they could spread like cancer throughout an area, destroying everything in
their paths. The urban renewal program seems to have been a direct attempt to destroy
the source of slums, and to save downtown areas from a fate of urban blight.
Housing had an important role to play in this fight against urban disease. Officials
and planners noticed that not only was most new housing being constructed in suburbs,
but commercial areas were also moving with the new housing. Many of the most
powerful people in every city had large downtown landholdings. As people and
businesses deserted downtowns, leaders feared that slums would spread, devaluing their
investments and weakening their power and influence.
So, for slightly different reasons, planners and downtown businessmen both
supported the 1948 bill, hoping it would stop slums and reinvigorate central city areas.
Two other groups, both of whom supported the 1937 bill, also lent their support to its
1948 modification. Labor unions and housing advocates both worked in favor of the bill,
each for their own reasons. According to Bauman, "the economic concerns of downtown
businessmen dovetailed with the reform agenda ofhousers, planners, and organized
labor" (79). Presumably, unions supported the bill because union members were prime
candidates to become public housing tenants. Housing advocates such as Catherine Bauer
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of Philadelphia generally supported any strengthening of public housing. Bauer
supported this bill, but it seems she had a serious reservation. She pushed for housing on
the urban periphery, while the bill specifically kept it in central cities by tying it to slum
clearance.
All of these groups used their support to influence the legislation that became the
Public Housing and Urban Development Act of 1948. Congress showed, through its
speeches and debates, why it thought housing legislation was important.
According to Bauman, the T.E.W. bill was first conceived essentially as a
redevelopment bill. The housing shortage and a reasonably powerful pro-housing lobby
caused lawmakers to include provisions for public housing and to state that
redevelopment areas be used primarily for residential purposes (92). His assessment
seems to coincide with the arguments presented in the Congressional Digest. No real
opposition existed in Congress to the redevelopment portions of the bill. The bill also
made slight changes to mortgage finance laws, which no Representatives opposed. All of
the controversy surrounding the bill involved the provisions for public housing. In 1948,
the National Association of Real Estate Brokers, the North American Home Builders, and
the American Savings and Loan League attacked the public housing sections of the bill as
ttcommunistic." The bill was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 45 to 48. According to
Bauman, President Truman was very angry. The next year, behind the active support of
the President and a letter writing campaign by Dorothy Montgomery of the Philadelphia
Housing Association and Lee Johnson of the National Public Housing Council, the bill
was finally passed and enacted into law (92).
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What happened during the congressional debates immediately before the bill's
passage? What reasons did our representatives give for opposing or supporting the
W.E.T. bill? How did this reasoning correspond to the dominant ideas and concerns of
the time?
Senator Ralph Flanders, a Republican from Yennont, summarized the
progressive-liberal view on the public housing. He stated that the fonner system had
"failed to achieve efficiency and economy of the modem industrial system" (CD 174).
His words stemmed from the belief that technology and progress would inevitably make
everyone's lives better, if we only committed ourselves wholeheartedly to it. To Flanders
and other members of Congress, our urban crisis was an anomaly that simply did not fit
their view of how the world worked. All the best modem "experts" had committed their
skills to the public housing program, yet it was not successful. Despite the lack of
success, both Congress and the general public trusted "experts" more than ever.
According to Bauman, "Between 1935 and 1960, the authority of the so-called expert
burgeoned and infused a larger and larger sphere of American life" (91). The influence of
housing experts is apparent in the debate over the 1948 T .E. W. Bill.
While congressmen did not ever mention that their ideas came from "experts,"
they showed the sort of top-down planning and detached rationality that epitomized an
expert's point of view. The housing program is the answer to a giant puzzle that is
governed by a rational and strict set of rules. Supporters of the bill were attempting to
maximize industrial efficiency, to encourage support for our democratic system of
government, to clear slums, and to provide housing for working-class Americans,
especially veterans. Those opposing the bill feared the new law would interfere with
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private industry, cost the government too much money, and tum our country into a
socialist state.
Perhaps the most "progressive" goal of the bill's proponents was to promote
econonlic efficiency. Senator Flanders claimed that the bill would encourage research
toward new techniques, materials, and methods for mass production. He also supported
the bill's "financing aids for the establishment of mass production methods and the
creation of mass markets." His vision of efficiency required the cooperation of labor
unions and local communities. He wanted workers to "accept labor-saving devices and
techniques." In addition, he thought local communities should modernize building codes
and reduce corruption. If everything worked well, this broadening of markets would lead
to "new business opportunities and profits" and "more and steadier jobs" (CD 176).
Senator Flanders was not alone in supporting the bill for economic reasons. Raymond
Foley, the administrator of the U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, claimed that
with proper government help, the housing industry could be worth seven billion dollars
each year, "contributing to national prosperity." Without government help, the
construction industry's productivity varied greatly from one year to the next. Wide
fluctuation in building caused unsteadiness in employment which affected the national
econonly. To solve this problem, Foley advocated government programs, like the T.E.W.
bill, to help the construction industry build for members of society who previously could
not afford quality housing (186).
The alleged economic benefits of the T.E.W. bill were closely tied to another
benefit. All members of Congress can attribute their power and place in status to our
democratic system of government. If average citizens lost faith in our democratic system
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of government, congressmen would be first to lose their power. A socialist revolution
seemed to be a very real fear for the Congress of 1948. They suspected that if widespread
unemployment and substandard housing continued, people might soon look to change
their government. Even if the system didn't change, certainly many congressmen would
lose elections. During the debates, Senator Brien McMahon, a Democrat from
Connecticut, emphasized that point when he proclaimed that the American home is the
"bulwark of our liberties" (184). Raymond Foley agrees, claiming that a supply of
adequate housing is "essential to a sound and stable democracy" (186). Many lawmakers
believed that socialist ideas, among other ills, originated in slums. Eradicating slums was
essential to their plan.
Slum clearance was the primary program of the T.E.W. bill, and nearly everyone
in Congress supported it. As stated before, all of the controversy concerned the public
housing provisions. Without the immense popUlarity of slum clearance, the public
housing provisions would never have become law. The debates in 1948 indicate that
Congress was much more concerned with removing slums than with providing quality
housing. Senator Flanders believed that "slums are contaminating the lives of millions of
Americans" (174). Raymond Foley urged congress to "eliminate slums and blighted
areas" (186). A widespread belief in environmental determinism, the notion that an
individual's physical environment has a profound influence on his role in society, fueled
these concerns. Senator McMahon claimed that bad housing caused juvenile
delinquency, and that cramped conditions led to an increase in "nervous and mental
disorders" (184). Mr. Foley states that "the character of a home affects the character of a
family." Rates of disease and crime were higher in the "blighted" areas of the cities.
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While the physical condition of the housing probably did not directly cause crime and
disease, supporters of the TEW bill certainly pretended it did. Many writers of the time
referred to slums as "blighted" and urban problems as "cancer." When Congress heard
poor areas described in these terms, rehabilitation was obviously not the solution. The
only remedy for serious disease is massive surgery, and Urban Renewal certainly fit the
bill. Public housing, at times, seemed to be an afterthought. In general, members of
Congress emphasized destroying urban problems over providing urban solutions.
Leading the fight against emphasizing slum clearance over affordable housing, just as she
did in 1937, was Catherine Bauer of Philadelphia. She firmly believed that public
housing should be built where people wanted to live: on the urban fringes, far from slum
and urban renewal areas (Bauman 44). For the 1948 law, Congress did at least pay
attention to some of the housing advocates' concerns. The bill stated that urban renewal
areas must be redeveloped for "primarily residential" purposes. Senator Flanders
declared that any programs of slum clearance must ·be accompanied by an adequate
supply of low-income housing. Many proponents of the bill were public housing
supporters, but even they expected the housing sections of the bill to "ride the coattails"
of the slum clearance provisions.
The public housing portions of the law may have had limited support in Congress,
but they were quite popular with the American people. Senator McMahon alleged that
adequate housing was the American people's "number one social concern." He contended
that the "situation is urgent" and that four to five million families were living "doubledup" because they could not find housing. He also said that the "number of veterans who
lack housing is alarming" (CD 184). Senator Robert Taft, a Republican from Ohio and
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one of the bill's major sponsors, stated that fewer that half of veterans and half of families
could afford standard housing. In addition, he believed that "countries have an obligation
to see that people have housing they can afford" (178). Before World War II,
homebuilders generally only built for the "high end" of the market. Theoretically, as
wealthy people moved into new housing, middle-class people would move into their
homes. As they moved on, those below them on the economic ladder would move to
their housing. In theory, this cycle of housing provided housing for everyone, even
though new housing was built mostly for the wealthy. Supporters of new public housing
for the poor noticed a couple of reasons why the cycle was not working. Senator Flanders
claimed that "filtering down" did not work because too few people were at the top of the
system, so relatively little housing was built. Senator Taft observed that too few people at
the bottom of the cycle had enough money to properly care for homes, so they fell into
disrepair and became slums. Their arguments were good ones, and new public housing
was built due to their efforts. However, while this public housing was for poor people, it
was definitely not for the poorest people, as it is today. Senator Taft emphasized that
public housing was intended for the "lowest-income workers with steady jobs." Congress
had many important reasons for serving the working class. Labor unions and veterans'
groups were very politically powerful. A skilled worker who needs quality housing has
great potential to contribute to the national economy. A home is one prerequisite to
keeping a steady job. Additionally, a worker is able to purchase all the essentials of
twentieth-century American life: home appliances, a car, and food and clothes for his
family. If you give housing to an extremely poor, unskilled person, not only can he not
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pay rent, but he will not hold a steady job, and therefore will not contribute to the
economy through his purchases.
While fear of socialism drove some of the bill's support, the same fears motivated
much of its opposition. Opponents did not believe the federal government should be
involved in public housing for three major reasons. They argued that the federal
government did not have the money, that public housing interfered with the private
housing industry, and that large programs such as public housing would increase in size
until they caused the U.S. to beconle a socialist state.
The arguments that the federal government could not afford public housing
centered on the idea that state and local governments could afford it. Senator James
Kern, a Republican from Missouri, stated that the federal debt was 258 billion dollars,
and the state and local debt amounted to 2.5 billion dollars (179). He reasoned that local
governments should pay for public housing, because their debt was so much lower. The
U.S. Chamber of Commerce agreed, stating that "state and local governments should bear
responsibility," because the federal government "has no money" (185).
In addition to attacking the program's affordability, its opponents challenged its

effect on private builders. Senator George Malone, a Republican from Nevada, believed
we didn't need "new agencies, new bureaus, and additional road blocks in the path of
private enterprise builders" (175). Senator Harry Cain, a Republican from Washington,
thought public housing would intrude on private housing's market, claiming that "public
housing will be built at the expense of private housing" (181).

The Chamber of

Commerce stated that to provide the most housing, private industry should be free of
"unnecessary government regulation." The Chamber might be refereeing to public

30

housing's use of scarce building materials. If not, its assertions are questionable, because
the proposed program included no real "regulation" of private industry.
One concern that stirred congressmen's emotions was the accusation that the
program was Communistic. Senator Kern explains to his fellow congressmen that the bill
is an example of the "Russian" economic system that Europeans have tried to combine
with the American system, producing "unhappy results." He believed the proposed law is
an attempt to "scuttle the American system." He believed that "the sky is the limit" for
government spending (179). The Chamber of Commerce agreed, asserting that once the
government started spending money on the projects, it would continue even if the plans
did not work.
In general the bill's opposition was voiced by conservatives who did not want any
money spent on federal employees, anti-Communists who attacked social programs, and
congressmen who seemed to cater to the interests of the high-end building industry.
Interestingly, both the bill's support and its opposition claimed to be helping the
construction industry. It is also interesting to note that no one attacked the usefulness or
effectiveness of public housing. The spectacular failures that haunt public housing's
image today had not happened yet, and Congress still believed that public housing would
work.
The arguments for and against the 1948 Taft-Ellender-Wagner bill were very
similar to those voiced in the debates concerning the 1937 public housing law. Through
labor unions and veterans' groups, public housing still had an important constituency. It
was still meant for the working poor. Additionally, congressmen still believed that public
housing was a necessary part of improving the economy by expanding markets for
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consumer goods. The major differences were that Congress in 1948 was more concerned
about the voters who would benefit from public housing, while they were less concerned
about unemployment in the building trades. The depression was over, but many veterans
had returned from the war in need of housing. Also, the 1937 law seemed to be a housing
law with urban renewal as an afterthought. The 1949 law was an urban renewal law with
housing as an afterthought. The change in emphasis is subtle, but it had a profound effect
on the events that unfolded following the passage of the 1949 law.
Both the 1937 law and the 1949 law provided money for the construction and
operating costs of public housing. Neither included any provisions for major renovations
or modernization expenses. In the early 1950s, the original public housing projects were
in need of their first major renovation. For the first time, housing authorities were faced
with a major expense and no way to fund it (Hartman).
At the same time, two non-controversial aspects of the 1949 Housing Act
conspired with geographic trends to drastically change public housing's clientele. The
1949 law specifically prohibited Housing Authorities from discriminating against tenants
who were receiving public assistance, such as welfare. Additionally, it required housing
authorities to give special consideration to tenants displaced by government action,
including urban renewal. Welfare recipients and those displaced by urban renewal were
mostly poor and black. Soon after the law went into effect, massive suburban building
projects opened single-family homes to those who could never before afford them. Many
working-class public housing tenants could then afford to move, and most did.
Simultaneously, another migration was occurring. Massive numbers of poor blacks fled
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the economic and civil-rights problems of the urban South, and they arrived in northern
cities in record numbers (Stegman 53).
All of these trends conspired to drastically alter the profile of the average public
housing tenant. Before 1950, most had been poor, white, working class families. After
1950, tenants became increasingly poorer and a higher percentage were black. These
poorer families could afford to pay much less rent than the working-class families who
moved to the suburbs, and housing authority revenues began to decline, just as their
expenses were increasing. Besides renovation expenses, the new, extremely poor tenants
brought a host of social problems to public housing. Public housing projects had been
built as an antidote to the slums, but now they were becoming slums themselves.
The slum clearance authorized by the 1949 law was only exacerbating public
housing'S problems. First, urban renewal did not really help to supply new housing.
According to Martin Anderson, who wrote The Federal Bulldozer in 1964, "In line with
the belief that urban renewal has alleviated the housing problem is the belief that the
federal urban renewal program is essentially another kind of public housing for low
income families. This is not true; only a small fraction of the total construction in urban
renewal is devoted to public housing" (7). Besides not supplying much new housing, the
urban renewal program actually intensified the housing crisis among the very poor
because it destroyed so much housing. Anderson summarized urban renewal's effect on
housing: "In essence, the federal urban renewal program eliminated 126,000 low-rent
homes, of which 80 percent were substandard, and replaced them with about 28,000
homes, most of them in a much higher rent bracket" (67). Writing about Philadelphia,
Bauman agreed that urban renewal had a negative effect on public housing:
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"Philadelphiats experience illustrates exquisitely the untoward consequences of shackling
public housing to urban development" (Bauman in Schaffer 238). Clearly, most of public
housing's problems began soon after the 1949 law went into effect.
Interestingly, the majority of problems experienced in public housing following
the 1949 act were not caused by controversial policy decisions. The only controversial
portion of the bill, that which authorized new public housing construction, did little to
harm the program. The most problematic policy decision was keeping public housing in
slum areas, closely tied to urban redevelopment. This locational decision led to many
troubles, but no congressmen disputed it. A few housing advocates, such as Catherine
Bauer, did advocate building public housing on the urban fringe, but the idea was not
taken seriously enough to enter congressional debate. Public housing had reasonably
powerful support in 1948, but urban renewal had the strong support of downtown
businesses, who counted on it to salvage their investments. In an effort to save our citiest
central business districts, the quality of our public housing was compromised.
In the early 1950s, one could see the beginnings of a regime shift among social
scientists who studied housing. According to Bauman, in 1951 "houser-planners, with
the aid of contemporary sociological theory, had begun stripping away the lingering traces
of communitarian idealism that once undergirded the vision of public housing" (125).
Thinkers such as Morris Janowitz and William H. Whyte espoused the ideal of the heroic
individual who pursued socially defined goals and stood out from the "lonely crowd." As
the physical quality of low-income housing improved, social problems continued, and
many people began to question environmental determinism. Goals of planners, such as
diversity, became less important, and individual goals received more attention.

34

According to Whyte, since individuals voluntarily selected neighborhoods, their
preferences for homogenous communities deserved the same respect as others' desires for
diversity (125).
At the 1951 Michigan Housing Conference, led by Frederick Gutheim, housing
experts again focused on individual needs. Social scientists at the conference looked to
individual and social, rather than societal and economic, reasons for public housing's
problems. One of the conference's conclusions was that "some families have natural
homemaking abilities, others don't. Some are teachable, others are marooned in bad
living habits and routines. Individuality is an important factor in relating particular
families to a particular type of house" (126). This conclusion seems obvious today, but
individual needs had never been a priority for public housing. Rather than the
environmentally deterministic mantra of "good housing makes good people," social
scientists in the 1950s began to conclude that tlgood people make good housing" and "bad
people make bad housing." Even progressive-liberal standard-bearers like Catherine
Bauer Wurster adjusted their views to accommodate individual needs and preferences. In
1952, she commented on how her perspective had changed since the 1930s. She realized
that constructing large high-rise projects would not "suddenly transform (housing
projects) into models of Dutch neatness, German discipline, Scandinavian co-operative
genius, and Latin urbanity." The communal ideals of the 1930s were no longer valid in
the 1950s. She went on to state, "At the time (the 1930s) there was a widespread feeling
among progressive housers and planners that social, economic, and technological forces
would push us inevitably in a single direction: toward a more collective mode of life."
Wurster recognized the strength of the individual and of the family unit by recommending
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the building of "much smaller, more varied public housing developments with a bona-fide
domestic character." (126)
These changes in professional opinion coincided with changes in public opinion
toward government-subsidized housing. Elizabeth Wood stated "the concept of public
housing as modem safe, and sanitary waystations for the mobile working class faded in
the late 1950s" (Bauman in Schaffer 249). Richard Bingham noted in his book, Public

Housing and Urban Renewal, that in 1958, public housing was described by some as
"human cesspools, ...massive barracks for the destitute, ... a twenty million dollar slum.
Public housing has become synonymous with welfare, unemployment, illegitimacy,
crime, drugs ... " (58). Bauman explains this change in public opinion: "Even in the
'cooperative' social environment of the 1930s, Americans had responded phlegmatically
at best to public housing. During the individualistic postwar years, opposition to public
housing stiffened. Seemingly, the fortunes of public housing fluctuated inversely with the
index of economic indicators, which climbed steadily in the early 1950s" (136). He also
notes that the 1950s suburban lifestyle "fostered an intensive family lifestyle and social
conservatism" (136). Fears of socialism in this time of McCarthyism may also have
played a role in diminishing public housing's reputation.
Public housing's decreased popUlarity, combined with the continued power of
downtown business, led to the passage of the 1954 Housing Act. This act made only
minor adjustments to the 1949 act, but it had the effect of strengthening urban renewal
and weakening public housing. The act removed the stipulation that urban
redevelopment areas be used primarily for residential purposes. It also made urban
renewal easier by stating that only twenty percent of buildings had to be substandard for
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an area to be considered "blighted" (136). After this law went into effect, the pace of
urban redevelopment increased. Public housing construction also increased, but only
because more housing was needed to re-house those displaced by urban renewal.
Because many of these people were removed from standard housing, the increase in
housing construction did little to alleviate problems.
The aftennath of the 1948 and 1954 laws began to redefine public housing's role
in our society. Though much housing was built, this led to little progress in solving social
problems. Progressive-liberal ideals began to lose favor with housing experts and with
the public, and public housing began to acquire a negative reputation. Public housing
changed from a program that accommodated the upwardly mobile working class into a
welfare program that served the poorest Americans. All of these changes had profound
effects on Congress' debate of the next major housing legislation, Lyndon Johnson's rentsubsidy program.

37

THE 1966 RENT SUBSIDY PROGRAM
By the 1960s, the political and economic climate for the discussion of public housing
issues was quite different that it was in 1937 or 1948. There was no longer a housing crisis for
America's white middle class (Bauman in Schaffer 245). Private builders had produced an
ample supply of inexpensive single-family housing that, combined with federally-subsidized
loans and highways, made suburban housing available to many people. As the working class's
need for housing disappeared, so, too, did much of the political power of the housing advocates.
Even so, the housing dilemma was not solved for all Americans. Increasing numbers of people
were "left behind" by our country's newfound prosperity. During the 1950s, more and more of
these people had moved into public housing. During the 1960s, public housing's mission shifted
to serve these new residents.
By the 1960s, the average public housing resident was becoming increasingly poor.
Federal housing policy changed to accomodate this fact. According to Bauman, " ... under
Kennedy, Washington retooled public housing policy and transformed housing projects into
welfare centers for the poor" (182). John Pynoos wrote, "Over the years, family public housing
has experienced a shift from poor white tenants, either temporarily unemployed or working, to
primarily welfare-dependent minority tenants. A major cause of this shift has been the rising
numbers of public-welfare recipients among the general population of those who need public
housing" (Pynoos 190). Many writers noticed the change in public housing's clientele. Oscar
Lewis, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Nathan Glazer all refered to the "culture of poverty" that
they noticed developing in America's cities. Alvin Schorr described a "cycle of poverty." He
observed that the percentage of Blacks in public housing between 1951 and 1961 had increased
from 41 percent to 51 percent. Over the same time period, the average incomes of public
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housing residents increased 13 percent, while the average income for all Americans increased
44%. (Bauman 182)
The emphasis in federal housing policy shifted from economic support to social work.
According to Bauman, " ... by November 1963, public housing had evolved from a large-scale
community building program aimed at supplying safe and sanitary housing environments to
upwardly mobile working-class families into a housing strategy emphasizing the delivery of
welfare services to socially and psychologically demoralized tenants" (182).

In light of the changing purpose of public housing, Congress considered Lyndon
Johnson's "rent subsidy" program in 1966. This program would begin the shift away from
Housing Authority owned, government-funded housing, toward privately owned, governmentsubsidized housing. Pubic housing's new negative reputation contributed to the climate of the
talks. For the first time, housing advocates did not support additional public housing. They still
supported housing programs, but more and more neo-conservative ideas can be seen within the
otherwise progressive-liberal "Great Society" rent subsidy program. Congress believed that the
distribution of housing units throughout a city would allow tenants to live beside employed,
middle-class neighbors. Theoretically, the middle-class neighbors would be "good examples" to
those on public assistance, helpingthem escape the "culture of poverty." The Rent Subsidy
program did not actually change public housing, but its debates involved many of the same
arguments that public housing debates did.
Supporters of the Rent Subsidy program used many of the same arguments that were
utilized in the debate over the 1949 and 1937 housing laws. They also developed some of their
own, which indicated that Congress' priorities were changing. Congress still believed that the
program would benefit the housing industry, by allowing more people to afford new housing.
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They still claimed that many people needed the program. They were still concerned that slum
housing was harming its residents. They were still concerned with saving central cities from
"blight." The program was clearly in the progressive-liberal tradition. One congressman even
went so far as to proclaim that all the past housing programs were good, but they just needed to
be bigger. Along with these older ideas, Congress had some new ideas. They were suddenly
concerned with "flexibility." They wanted to integrate different income levels and avoid
"labeling" residents. Perhaps most amazingly, were interested in protecting "the variety and
quality of urban life."
The House Committee on Banking and Currency, which endorsed the bill, clearly still
subscribed to Keynsian economic principles. It believed the bill would "enable many people of
low and moderate income to translate their housing needs into effective demand and thus lend
support to the homebuilding component of the economy" (CD 12). Individual lawmakers agreed.
Senator Thomas Dodd, a Democrat from Connecticut, supported the bill in part because it
"encourages private industry" (20). Representative Leonard Farbstein, a Democrat from New
York, insisted that the bill would benefit private builders, private owners, and private financers
(30). So, economic concerns were still very important to lawmakers. However, both Senator
Dodd and Representative Farbstein used the economic argument not as their primary motivation
for supporting the bill, but more as a defense against opponents who insisted the bill was
socialist.
Dodd seemed primarily concerned with abolishing slums. He insisted that "urban decay
remains the greatest unanswered domestic problem in America today." He complains that as
more people move to the suburbs, "slumlife grows darker, choking the downtown heart which
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once invigorated urban living." He argues that "children can never get a better life in the slums"
(20).
Dodd also adressed another important issue. Previous lawmakers were so concerned with
the possibility that public housing might compete with private housing that they set its income
ceiling at twenty percent below what is needed to afford private housing. This left many people
both ineligible for public housing and unable to afford private housing. Dodd argued that the
public housing program penalized ambition because it expelled "anyone who makes more than a
subsistence income" (20). So, he argued, families bypass chances to improve their income,
because they knew that they would lose their homes if they made more money. Robert Weaver,
the Administrator of the U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, agreed, stating that the twenty
percent gap leaves four million families without decent housing (16).
Representative Farbstein made different arguments, presenting many ideas which are still
followed today. He praised the Rent Supplement program because it would allow many
Americans to afford private housing. Being in private housing allows them to avoid being
segregated in public housing "ghettos." The privately-owned homes within the rent supplement
program would allow for a "healthy mix of people." Farbstein quoted Lyndon Johnson when he
stated that these developments would promote "the variety and quality of urban life" (30).
Farbstein's new arguments are important for many reasons. First, he calls public housing
a "ghetto" of the poor. Previously, lawmakers had always referred to slums, not public housing,
as "ghettos." In the past, they believed public housing would be the antidote to slums.
Farbstein's comment indicates that public housing projects are becoming the slums, not
eradicating them. Second, Farbstein's call for a "healthy mix of people" shows that he believed
public housing's mix of people was unhealthy. By 1966, attempts to eradicate crime and disease
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by tearing down slums and building public housing had been ongoing for thirty years. This
strategy, which was based on theory that bad housing caused these problems, was clearly not
working. Social scientists and .lawmakers alike grasped the idea that a large concentration of
poor people in one area caused social problems. Lawmakers believed that integrating housing
across income levels would prevent these problems. This belief is especially significant because
it is still popular today.
The concept of "variety and quality of urban life" came into wide acceptance after it was
popularized by writers like Jane Jacobs and William H. Whyte in the 1950s and 1960s. Before
then, and during the debate over the 1948 and 1937 laws, "urban life" was definitely not
en vogue. According to Bauman, "Nurtured as planners on a steady diet of anti-congestion

invectives, planners in the 1940s still equated slums and blight with land overcrowding and they
recited a litany of correlative evils such as poverty, high typhoid and tuberculosis rates, crime,
delinquency, and low levels of literacy (Bauman in Schaffer 231)." If one can assume that
"urban" can be somewhat correlated with density, the fact that Johnson and Farbstein mention
"urban life" could mean that the anti-congestion attitudes of the 1940s had begun to change.
Like its proponents, opponents of the Rent Subsidy program used a mixture of new and
old ideas to support their arguments. The congressmen fell back on such time-honored
arguments as insisting the program was socialist and worrying that it would be open to
corruption. The minority report of the House Conlmittee on Barlking and Currency suggested
that the rent subsidy bill was "foreign to American concepts" because it "kills incentive for
homeownership" (CD 13). Representative Paul Fino, a Republican from New York, worried that
economic integration might "educate" the more affluent people in a development ''to do exactly
what the underpriviledged person is doing-- cut down on his own initiative and enjoy the same
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kind of subsidy benefits his neighbor enjoys" (25). Fino and other congressmen also worry that
the bill gives the Housing Administrator too much power. Fino says the bill's language is "loose,
ambiguous, and flexible enough to write all kinds of abuses" (25). These concerns, while they
figure prominently into opponents' arguments, are not new or exciting.
The nl0st interesting arguments that are made against the bill involve the evils of
economic integration. Conservative congressmen speak with such horror about economic
integration that one may speculate they are really thinking about another kind of integration.
Several of the arguments against the bill could be thinly veiled attempts to do everything possible
to keep white people from having to live with black people.
The minority report of the House Committee on Banking and Currency states that it is
unfair for higher income tenants to have to live with lower income tenants. It also contains such
cryptic statements as "there is more to neighborhood preference than the monthly cost of one's
dwelling" (13). Mr. Fino worried that the program will "reweave the national social fabric" (25).
The Representatives did not go into detail about why they hold the views they do, so there is no
way of knowing for sure if they were racist. If they were not racist, they may have been worried
that their constituents would not approve of the program. Senator John Tower, a Republican
from Texas, insisted that people would not "take to (economic integration) too well" (21).
Whatever their reasoning, it is interesting that opponents of the bill, mostly Republicans, did not
support economic integration while proponents, mostly Democrats, did. As we shall see later,
the supporters of the 1997 housing bill, mostly Republicans, are very much in favor of economic
integration.
The Rent Subsidy program was one of the first programs to shift federal funding from
building housing authority-owned housing to subsidizing private housing. Though it did not
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have a major impact on public housing, the Congressional arguments concerning it are
interesting for a number of reasons. The supporters of the bill supported many of the same
housing ideas that are still popular today. The ideas they embraced became more and more
popular throughout the 1970s and 1980s, eventually revealing themselves again twenty years
later in the arguments over the 1997 housing bill.
Not only did new ideas creep into Congress' thinking, but the answers to the questions of
"Why?" and "For whom?" were different in 1966 than they were in 1937 and 1948. Public
housing tenants had become very poor, and undeniable social problems persisted in housing
projects. In light of these developments, the Rent Subsidy Program was meant to "fix" public
housing, not simply to expand it, like in 1948. Congress looked for alternatives because
traditional public housing was not working. Clearly, public housing's new, very poor tenants
contributed to its problems.
While housing's clientele had changed, its economic purpose remained. The Rent
Supplement program was firmly grounded in Progressive-Liberal theory, aiming to expand our
nation's markets by helping the poor to ascend the economic ladder.
THE 1974 HOUSING ACT AND THE SECTION EIGHT PROGRAM
The debate over who public housing should be for-- very low income Americans or a
mix of incomes including the working class-- continued. This nagging question has plagued
public housing for the last thirty years. In 1969, Congress passed the Brooke Amendment, which
capped public housing rents at twenty-five percent ofa family'S income (Stegman 53). Many
local housing authorities were already experiencing a funding crisis, and the Brooke Amendment
reduced already insignificant revenue. In 1972, to address the problem, Congress authorized the
payment of operating subsidies to local housing authorities (CD 1997 227). The subsidies
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increased every year, and Congress looked for ways to replace the traditional public housing
program with something more cost-effective.
In 1974, Congress created the Section 8 program by revising Section 8 of the 1937 Public
Housing Act. Though the traditional public housing program remained in existence, Section 8
became the main vehicle for low-income housing assistance. At first, the Section 8 program
included components intended to stimulate new housing construction and housing rehabilitation
as well as certificates and vouchers for tenant- and project-based assistance. In 1983, Congress
repealed the "New Constuction" and "Substantial Rehabilitation" components of the program.
Soon after, it ceased to fund the "Moderate Rehabilitation" component. Since then, the Section 8
program has consisted solely of Housing Certificates and Housing Vouchers (231).
Housing Certificates can be both tenant-based and project-based, but no more than fifteen
percent of anyone housing authority's certificates may be project-based. With tenant-based
certificates, low-income tenants rent units from a private landlord at or below the federally-set
Fair Market Rent for a particular area. The tenant pays thirty percent of her income, and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development pays the difference. "Tenant-based" means that
the subsidy is tied to the occupants. At the end of a lease, they may move into another approved
unit and keep the same subsidy arrangement. Project-based certificates are similar, except that
the subsidy is tied to a unit. When one family vacates, another eligible family may occupy that
unit and take advantage of the subsidy for that unit (231).
Housing vouchers were authorized by Congress in 1983. The most popular component of
Section 8, they are very similar to tenant-based housing certificates. Instead of choosing a unit
that rents for the less than the Fair Market Rent of an area, eligible tenants may rent any unit in
which the rent is "reasonable," as determined by HUD. The federal government will pay the
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difference between the Fair Market Rent and thirty percent of a tenant's income. If a unit's rent
is more that the Fair Market Rent, the tenant will pay more than thirty percent of his income as
rent. If the rent is less, he will pay less than thirty percent (231).
The Section 8 program continues to be the most important part of our housing policy
throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Traditional public housing continues to exist, but most
new funding goes to Section 8 programs. Although housing programs have changed significantly
over the past thirty years, one fundamental argument concerning government-assisted housing
has remained. Congress still argues over who public housing is for: those who are poorest and
need it the most, or the somewhat less poor, who might give programs a greater chance of
success.
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THE 1997 HOUSING OPPORTUNITY AND RESPONSIBILITY ACT
In January of 1997, Representative Rick Lazio, a Republican from New York, introduced

House Resolution 2, the Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act. The act, if passed, would
have repealed the 1937 Housing Act and would have made several changes to current federal
housing programs. examination of the various argument used by Congress, both in favor and
against the bill, illustrates their connection to the dominant political and economic ideas of the
late 1990s. Comparison of these arguments to those surrounding the 1937, 1948, and 1966
housing acts reveals some significant changes in Congress' beliefs over time.
According to the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, the 1997 housing
bill was designed to "remove disincentives for residents to work and become self-sufficient,
provide rental protections for low-income residents, deregulate the operation of public housing
authorities, and give more power and flexibility to local governments to operate housing
programs" (CD 236). Major provisions of the bill include the following: consolidating funding
into two block grants, allowing housing authorities to prohibit individuals who have a history of
drug or alcohol abuse from moving into public housing, requiring unemployed adults in public
housing to perform 8 hours of community service per month; setting income-targeting provisions
that allow more working-class tenants into public housing, allowing housing authorities to set
minimum rents, providing for some resident management, and allowing for the possibility of
"home rule flexible grants." A "home rule flexible grant" would allow the federal government to
give nl0ney that it had previously allocated directly to HUD to local governments instead,
provided that HUD approved the local government's financial plan. The bill also included
provisions to help HUD take over the management of "troubled" housing authorities.
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The bill's supporters present a variety of reasons why these changes would be beneficial.
The ideals of flexibility, income mixing, and preserving urban vitality that were introduced
during the debates over the 1966 Rent Subsidy program figure prominently in their reasoning.
Additionally, they use the idea of local control, used by the progressives in 1937. They reject
environmental determinism, choosing instead to value "community" over actual physical
dwellings. Rather than speaking of society's responsibility to help the poor, they speak of the
poor's "obligation to pursue self-sufficiency." The Republicans' strongest argument may be
simply that the current program is not working. Even more interesting than the arguments which
the bill's supporters make are the arguments they fail to make. No one suggests any possible
economic benefits of public housing. Economic benefits apparently do not exist in 1997 as they
did in 1937 or 1948.
Nearly all members of Congress accept that allowing more working people into public
housing will improve it. Republicans, who support the housing reform bill, believe that those
improvements are worth making space for working people by excluding very poor people. They
firmly answer the question of "Who is housing for?" by stating that it is for the poorest people
who can support a stable community, not necessarily the poorest who need housing the most.
Representative Jim Leach is referring to the tendency of Public Housing to concentrate the very
poor when he states that "many aspects of current public housing programs" are failures (242).
Representative Bob Riley likes the proposed law because housing authorities "will have
flexibility to create mixed income environments." Rick Lazio brags that the legislation will
"remove federal rules that punish working families in public housing." He is also proud that it
"eliminate rules that concentrated poorest families" in the very worst housing (246). Mr. Lazio is
one of the few Republicans who tries to serve both sides of the argument by mentioning the
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poorest of the poor. He argues that we can create mixed-income neighborhoods "without
shutting out the poorest of American families from affordable housing opportunities." Income
mixing, or moving public housing toward slightly more affluent tenants, is obviously a part of the
Republicans' plans for public housing.
The idea of "preserving urban vitality," introduced in the debates over the 1966 law,
continues in 1997 with the idea of "community." Congress in 1997 seems very concerned with
the preservation of communities rather than the simple provision of housing units. Rick Lazio
states the proposed law is "less about shelter than it is about the creation of an environment
where we can begin to successfully address poverty" (246). Michael Castle, a Republican from
Delaware, speaks about "community based solutions" to housing problems (252). The
congresses of 1937 and 1948 were much more concerned with simply providing quality housing
than with "community," due to their firm belief in environmental determinism. Over the years,
we have learned that solving social problems is more complex than sin1ply providing housing
. that does not fall down. Congress recognizes this by specifically rejecting environmental
determinism, but there is no evidence that their plan for public housing will work, either.
Moving into a quality physical dwelling is at least a concrete change in a person's life. How are
we to judge improvements in "community," a concept which is very difficult to measure?
The issue of local control is very important to Republicans in congress today. "Local
control" is an issue that almost everyone supports, though each person's definition of the term is
as different as his reason for supporting it. For instance, liberals in 1937 supported local control
over public housing, but they advocated that it take the form of local housing authorities staffed
by professionals. They feared the corruption evident in local governments, and wanted to keep
public housing authorities separate from them. Conservatives in 1937 were also in favor of local
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control, because they wanted state and local governments to fund housing programs. Supporters
of the 1997 housing bill also support local control. Deborah Pryce, a Republican from Ohio,
likes the bill because it "returns more decision making authority to states and localities where it
belongs" (240). Michael Castle thinks that the bill will allow local housing authorities
"flexibility in managing federal funds" allowing them to better serve residents (252). Jack
Metcalf, a Republican from Washington, suggests that good local housing authorities will enjoy
"less federal interference" in their affairs (252). While congressional Republicans obviously
support local control, they make it less clear exactly why they think it will work. Time has
shown that housing authorities are affected by local politics and thus subject to corruption. In
fact, the boards of most authorities are appointed by local mayors (233). If local control allows
officials to devise innovative methods of serving public housing'S tenants, then it is a positive
development. However, there is no reason to believe that public housing will fit into local
leaders' economic deVelopment plans. Local leaders could easily divert public housing funds for
other uses. Local politicians are "closer to the people" than Congress, but they are also closer to
political pressure from local_business needs.
Local housing authorities must devise more cost-effective solutions to their housing
problems, as Congress anticipates that it will cut the housing budget. Jim Leach, a Republican
from Iowa, advocates "fiscal responsibility" and a "freeze on spending" (242). Deborah Pryce
concedes that the bill is needed in this time of "limited federal resources" (240). Michael Castle
wants to use the bill to "create fiscally sound and physically safe environments" (252).
According to the National Low Income Housing Coalition, Congress cut public housing'S
budget by twenty percent between 1995 and 1997, and the proposed housing bill would have
reduced it even more. Although no member of Congress mentions it in the debate, the bill would
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have eliminated the requirement to replace all demolished housing (NLllIC). Whatever the
effects of local control may be, Republican members of Congress clearly want to reduce funding
for housing.
In the arguments over the 1937 and 1949 laws, many members of Congress asserted that

society had a responsibility to help the poor. The mandatory community service provisions of
the bill indicate that current House Republicans believe that the poor have a responsibility to
society. Jim Leach states that the community service provisions uphold the "long-held American
precept that those who receive assistance from a community should give back to that community
in some way" (242). Deborah Pryce says that "those on federal assistance share a responsibility
and an obligation to pursue self-sufficiency" (240). Richard Baker, a Republican from
Louisiana, thinks the service requirements are positive because they provide an opportunity for
tenants to attain valuable skills (248).
One strong argument for overhauling any program is that that the program is ineffective.
Housing reform supporters believe that the current public housing system is a complete failure.
Jim Leach states that "many aspects of the current public housing programs ... have been judged
by experts as well as the public as a failure" (242). Rick Lazio asserts that the current system is a
"portrait of a failed past." He believes the status quo condemns people to a "life without hope,
life without sense of community, life without the rewards of individual achievement or success."
He also says the old system "force(s) children to grow up in an environment of violent crime
where they are isolated from the economic and social opportunities of mainstream America"
(242). Richard Baker thinks that the current system "condemns children to an awful life" (248).
Bob Riley thinks that the old system was a "short-term solution" that became a "long-term
problenl" (252). The American people, like Congress, view public housing as a failure. Public
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housing clearly has problems, but we need a viable solution to our low-income housing crisis.
Public housing could be a valuable aspect of that solution. In 1993, the number of households
that pay more than fifty percent of their income for rental housing rose to an all-time high of 5.3
million. According to HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo, only 75 out of 3,400 housing authorities
are considered "troubled." In many large cities, public housing accounts for a large percentage of
the housing that is available to very low-income families (234). Sudhir Venkatesh, in a study of
Chicago'S public housing, concludes that many tenants are satisfied with public housing. He
asserts that a "community" has developed in public housing, and that it is best improved
gradually, rather than with a drastic overhaul that will displace its residents. After all, was not
urban renewal a drastic overhaul that everyone thought would work well?
The bill's opponents are dissatisfied with a number of its components. They believe that
public housing is basically working, and that a few troubled housing authorities in big cities give
it a bad reputation. They believe that allowing more working-class tenants into public housing
. will result in the poorest tenants becoming homeless. They argue that the repeal of the 1937
housing act will weaken federal housing law and symbolically show that we are no longer
committed to housing the poor. They also object to the requirements for community service.
Democrats in Congress today think that most public housing is working. Joseph Kennedy
of Massachusetts says we "should not condemn the entire system" because of the failing of a few
housing authorities. According to Kennedy, Republicans do not support public housing because
"it has become fashionable for politicians to identify some God-awful monstrosity where we
have warehoused the poorest of the poor, then walk in front of these awful buildings and say
'Gosh, this is a terrible condemnation of the Lyndon Johnson Democratic commitment to the
poor, and it obviously does not work" (CD 243). Bernard Sanders of Vermont, Congress's only
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independent, believes public housing works in many places (245). Another Representative,
Bruce Vento, a Democrat from Minnesota, says that the majority of public housing is good (253).
Of course,·whether public housing is "good" and whether or not it is "working" are very, very
difficult concepts to define, and no one in Congress even attempts to do so.
Democrats agree with the Republican's notion that allowing more working people into
public housing will improve public housing, but they believe that doing so will also create more
homeless people. Kennedy believes that housing authorities should not "throw out poor people"
(243). Jesse Jackson, Jr. of Illinois says that the bill will "add to the homeless" (247). Barney
Frank of Massachusetts concedes that housing authorities will improve when the poor are
excluded, but argues that our overall housing situation will deteriorate (255). Nearly all agree
that too many families with "social problems" concentrated in public housing is bad, but to what
extent is lower income correlated with drug use and crime? Raymond Struyk noticed this in his
book A New System for Public Housing. He advocates income mixing, but says "serious
questions still remain about the value of a goal attracting higher-income tenants as opposed to
more responsible tenants."
Democrats in Congress have other objections to the bill. They do not want to repeal the
1937 Housing Act, nor do they want to require public housing residents to perform community
service. They believe that repealing the housing act which began public housing would
symbolically "abandon our commitment to the poor" (CD 247). They also compare public
housing to other federal subsidies such as tax breaks, and ask why corporate CEOs and other
high-income federal beneficiaries are not required to perform community service. These
objections are important, but most opposition to the bill came about because it cut public
housing's funding. Kennedy, Sanders, and Waters all agree that their major objection is that the
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proposed bill would have cut HUDs budget by twenty-five percent. If the funding were restored,
they may have supported other parts of the bill.
Congress reveals a major reason for overhauling public housing in the arguments it
avoids. The two major reasons Congress voted for public housing in 1937 and again in 1949
were concerns about economic development and helping large groups who were potentially large
voting blocks. Today, neither of these exists, which may be the reason that Congress wants to
restructure public housing and reduce its funding.
During the debates over the 1937 and 1948 housing laws, proponents made very powerful
economic arguments in favor of public housing. In 1937, our national prosperity depended on
the benefits that public housing would bring to employment and the consumption of durable
goods. In 1948, when Congress feared that our downtowns would be suffocated by expanding
slums, housing was one of many proposed remedies. In today's economic climate, public
housing seems to be more ofa chore that we must complete in order to appease our guilty
consciences, rather than something we must do to ensure our economic survival. No one in
Congress mentions any economic benefits of public housing. As low-income jobs continue to
move offshore, the low-income jobs that public housing residents might hold are increasingly
unimportant to our national economy. The goods that poor people can consume are insignificant
compared to what a single high-income family can consume. In 1995, the average income for a
public housing tenant was $6,420. That means it would take five public housing families to
consume what a family with an income of $30,000 does alone. By the same reasoning, it would
take more than fifteen public housing families to consume what one family with an income of
$100,000 does. Why would Congress spend large amounts of effort and money on those who
contribute so little to our national economy?
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Another major reason why Congress voted for public housing in 1937 and 1948 was to
appease different groups of people. In 1937, the labor movement was very important. In 1948,
labor was still important, and W orId War II veterans needed housing. Both times, there was
widespread public support for public housing. Today, this is not the case. According to Donald
Smith, the administrator of the Los Angeles Housing Authority, "Public housing has almost no
constituency" (Kandell 11). Joseph Kennedy states that "the poorest of the poor do not vote"
(CD 243). As public housing has attempted to serve poorer and poorer Americans, the political
power of its most obvious supporters, its residents, has decreased significantly.
On April 30, 1997, The House of Representatives passed the Housing Opportunity and
Responsibility Act by a more than 2 to 1 margin. The Senate also passed a housing reform bill in
September of 1997, but it was slightly different that the House's version. During the conference
committee, the bill was changed significantly, possibly due to pressure from President Bill
Clinton. In October 1998, President Clinton finally signed public housing reform into law as a
part of the 1999 HUDN A appropriations bill. The final bill institutes income targeting to form
mixed-income housing developments, requires community service, and consolidates housing
authority funding into block grants. The income targeting was softened from the original House
version of the bill. The final bill reserves forty percent of public housing for households who
make less than thirty percent of an area's median income, while the original House bill reserved
only thirty-five percent. On the issue of local control, the law authorizes a demonstration project
in which up to 100 local governments may apply for the federal funding that would normally go
to local housing authorities. Additionally, housing authorities may convert housing
developments into vouchers if their plan to do so is approved by HUD. To summarize, most of
what the Republicans in the House supported made it into the final bill. The one major surprise
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is that the budget for HUD has actually increased. Another notable addition is that of 50,000
new housing vouchers. Seventy-five percent of these vouchers are reserved for the "very low
income," who make less than thirty percent of an areas median income. If the law functions as it
appears, then it may be a true commitment to real income mixing. If more "very low income"
families use vouchers to live in private housing, and more "low income" families move into
public housing, then income mixing may be implemented without creating more homeless
people.
Some parts of the bill are exactly the way House Republicans hoped they would be, and
some parts are very different. We will have to wait at least a few years to witness the true effects
of the new public housing laws on our nation's low income housing problems. Although the
results of their latest actions remain inconclusive, Congress' attitudes toward public housing
have most certainly changed over the last sixty years. Every major expansion of public housing
came about either because Congress had a major economic reason or because they wanted to
appease a certain group. In the last thirty years; Congress has used public housing to attempt to
deliver welfare services to increasingly poor tenants. More recently, Congress has attempted to
shift public housing away from very low-income tenants. Congress has many reasons to try to
avoid providing programs for those with very low incomes. Those with low incomes usually do
not vote. Since we have discovered other methods of expanding markets to fuel economic
growth, we no longer need to stimulate consumption among the poor. Additionally, wealthy
Americans have proven thenlselves to be very good at consuming massive amounts of goods.
Unlike in the 1930s, we no longer face the threat of widespread social unrest. Public housing is
publicly regarded as a failure. Indeed, the language used in the debates concerning the Housing
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Opportunity and Responsibility Act of 1997 indicates that Congress views public housing as
ineffectual and nonessential to our national prosperity.
Both public housing's tenants and its economic function have changed significantly since
the program began in 1937. Public housing originally helped the working class to fully
participate in the expansion of our economy. According to Bauman, it was a "way station" for
the upwardly mobile poor. In 1948, Congress chose to expand public housing because it retained
a valid economic purpose and served a relatively powerful constituency. Congress meant to
expand markets, preserve downtowns, and provide housing to returning veterans. By the 1960s,
public housing served the poorest people in our country. Housing no longer retained a
constituency, but it still had an economic purpose, because we still embraced Keynesian methods
of expanding markets. By 1997, public housing had a horrible reputation, no constituency, and
no economic reason for continuing to exist. With only their consciences to guide them, members
of Congress predictably attempted to dismantle public housing.
The traditional public housing program is clearly not the answer to our nation's current
housing crisis. However,ifwe are to find a solution, we must first develop a commitment to
helping the needy find quality housing. With no obvious political or economic motive for
helping the poor, it seems unlikely that we will solve our housing problems any time soon.
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